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GOVERNMENT SIZE AND TRUST  
 
                  
 
 
 
 
Abstract. This paper uses individual level data (the Japanese General Social Survey) to 
examine how government size influences generalized trust. After controlling for the 
endogeneity of government size using instrumental variables, I found: (1) Using all 
samples, government size is not associated with generalized trust, and (2) After 
splitting the sample into workers and non-workers, government size does not influence 
generalized trust for non-workers whereas it significantly reduces generalized trust for 
workers. This suggests that workers, through their work experience, might have to face 
greater bureaucratic red tape coming from “larger government”, leading to negative 
externality effects on relationships of trust in the labor market.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A growing number of researchers have drawn attention to the influence social 
capital has on various facets of human life (e.g., Putnam 1993, 2001; Fukuyama, 1995; 
Uslaner, 2002). It is has been argued that interpersonal trust, considered as a kind of 
social capital, has an important role in the enhancement of collective action and 
therefore deviation from the „prisoner‟s dilemma‟ (e.g., Putnam 1993; Hayami, 1995; 
Sønderskov 2009; Yamamura 2008b). Transaction costs are anticipated to be saved 
when people trust each other. Accordingly, economic efficiency is improved, resulting in 
economic growth (e.g., Knack, 1997; Knack & Keefer 1997; Whiteley 2000; Zak & Knack, 
2002; Beugelsdijk et al, 2004)1. Trust is thus regarded as a crucial element in economic 
development. How and why trust is formed in society is a critical question when 
considering the foundation of economic development. A growing number of reports have 
tackled this question (Glaeser et al., 2000; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Berggren and 
Jordahl, 2006; Bjørnskov 2006; Leigh, 2006 a, 2006b; Chan 2007). 
Previous work has mostly shed light on the effect of socio-economic heterogeneity 
on trust, finding that people are less likely to trust others in more heterogeneous 
societies (e.g., Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Bjørnskov 2006; Leigh, 2006b; Gustavsson & 
Jordahl 2008) 2 . Besides heterogeneities concerning race, language, and economic 
inequality, other important factors influence trust from the view point of political 
economy. Trust can be regarded as a function of institutions and policies. As noted by 
Putnam, “(t)he myriad ways in which the state encourages and discourages 
                                                   
1 Trust is associated with various economic outcomes such as tax compliance (Lassen, 
2007) and loan repayment (Cassar, 2007). 
2 As for economic inequality, in contrast to the United States, Leigh (2006b) found no 
apparent association between trust and inequality across Australia. 
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social-capital formation have been under-researched […] Such questions represent of 
the many unexplored frontiers in social-capital research.” (Putnam & Goss 2001, p.17). 
Government decision-making impedes individual decision making in the market when 
government spending increases relative to voluntary spending; the government is thus 
thought to interrupt market activity3. As found by Goel & Nelson (1998), government 
size is positively associated with the prevalence of corruption, since a larger government 
leads to greater bureaucratic red tape4. The perception of corruption seems to hamper 
economic activities such as investment (Mauro 1995). Government size is thus 
negatively associated with economic growth 5 . Various institutional conditions are 
important to enhance market transactions and the formation of trust (Berggren & 
Jordahl, 2006)6. Corrupt activity by public officials erodes the institutional conditions 
required to vitalize economic transactions along with fostering trust.   
Wolfe (1989) raised the hypothesis that civil society and the norm of reciprocity are 
“crowded out” if people are protected “from-the-cradle-to-the-grave” by large 
government. The welfare state is thus thought to squeeze communities and social 
networks. The argument leads me to conjecture that larger government results in lower 
trust7. However, if one considers previous reports, there seems little agreement as to 
                                                   
3 A market oriented economy leads to the formation of trust, stimulating further 
exchanges (Berggren & Jordahl, 2006). 
4 In transition countries, a larger government size reduces corruption (Goel and Budak 
2006).  Using various measures of government size, the relationship between 
government size and corruption is not stable (Glaeser & Saks 2006). 
5 The conjecture that resources are allocated less efficiently by larger governments, 
leading to lower economic growth is well supported (e.g., Landau, 1985; Peden & 
Bradley, 1989; Dar & AmirKhalkhalim 2002; Fölster & Herekson, 2002). On the other 
hand, some researchers find no discernable relationship between government size and 
economic growth (e.g., Ram, 1986; Bairam, 1990; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Mendoza et 
al., 1997). 
6 The conditions are the security of property rights, access to sound money, and freedom 
to exchange with foreigners. 
7 Analyzing the influence of government size on economic outcome is a major issue in 
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how government size affects trust. Berggren & Jordahl (2006) used cross country data 
to investigate the effect of government size on trust, but found no stable relationship 
between government size and trust. Kumlin and Rothestein (2005) used survey data 
from Sweden to show that a large welfare state possibly increases social capital when 
universal welfare programs are provided. According to Bergh and Bjørnskov (2009), 
there is the reverse causality that social trust facilitates the sustainability of a welfare 
state characterized by government expenditure.  Closer examination is needed to 
explore the impact of government size on social trust because this effect varies 
according to the particular situations confronted by an individual.  
Kumlin and Rothestein (2005) argued that people infer other‟s trustworthiness 
from how they perceive public service bureaucrats. Government size is thought to have 
a greater effect on workers than non-workers, since workers more frequently participate 
in market transactions. Furthermore, the perception of workers depends on whether 
they work in the public or private sector. This paper, therefore, attempts to investigate 
the effect of government size on trust for both workers and non-workers. To this end, I 
collated suitable data by combining prefecture and individual level data (the Japanese 
General Social Survey, hereafter JGSS), and used this data for statistical analyses8. The 
relationship between government size and trust has been examined mainly using 
individual level data from Western countries or cross country data. This paper is the 
                                                                                                                                                     
the field of political economics. There are many reports concerning the relationship 
between government size and economic growth (e.g., Peden & Bradley, 1989; Dar & 
Amirkhalkhali 2002; Angelopoulos et al., 2008). Recently, government size has been 
investigated in terms of individual perception. For instance, researchers have 
attempted to tackle the question of how and the extent to which the degree of life 
satisfaction is affected by government size (e.g., Bjørnskov et al., 2007; 2008a; 2008b, 
Yamamura 2009a). 
8 A Japanese prefecture is roughly equivalent to a state in the United States or a 
province in Canada. 
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first to examine how trust is influenced by government in Japan, a country in which the 
political and socio-cultural situation is distinctly different from that in Western 
countries. The major finding of this paper is that government size reduces the 
generalized trust of workers, but does not affect that of non-workers.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Features of Japanese society 
and the relationship between government size and generalized trust are briefly 
reviewed in Section 2. The next section explains the data and methods used. Section 4 
provides the results of the estimations and discussion. The final section offers 
concluding observations. 
 
2. Overview of Features of Japanese Society 
2.1.   Homogeneity and community mechanism 
Japan is a racially homogeneous society (Index Corporation, 2006)9, and in a group 
of countries with the lowest inequalities (Tachibanaki, 2005: Chapter 1). Assuming that 
people have a greater tendency to trust each other in a more homogeneous society (e.g., 
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Uslaner 2002; Bjørnskov 2006), this characteristic of 
Japan leads me to conjecture that the degree of trust in Japanese society is high. “The 
psychological basis of mutual trust could further be strengthened by incorporating 
personal elements in business transactions, such as the exchange of gifts and 
attendances at weddings and funerals” (Hayami 2001, 290). Accordingly, Japanese 
society is characterized not only by racial and economic homogeneity, but also by 
tightly-knit communities, resulting in interdependent trust being generated. Trust 
formed through long-term transactions made a great contribution to Japan‟s industrial 
                                                   
9 The component ratio of Japanese in the 1996 population was 99 % and suggests that 
Japan can be considered as a racially homogeneous society (Index Corporation, 2006). 
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development in the post-war period (Asanuma, 1989; Yamamura 2009b). Hence, when it 
comes to Japanese society, a high degree of trust appears in interpersonal relationships 
within tightly-knit communities or business groups.  
Reports (Uslaner 2002; Bjørnskov 2006) have categorized trust into generalized 
and particularized kinds 10 . “The central idea distinguishing generalized from 
particularized trust is how inclusive your moral community is.” (Uslaner, 2002: 26-27). 
People with generalized trust have positive views toward both their own in-group and 
out-groups, whereas those with particularized trust have positive views of their own 
in-group but a negative attitude toward groups to which they do not belong 11 . 
Generalized trust can be extended to strangers while particularized trust might be 
restricted to within a well-established personal network. Global economic integration 
appears to lead to national social disintegration and therefore the collapse 
tightly-knitted communities (Rodrik 1997). Hence, changes of economic circumstance 
would weaken the competitiveness of firms that have relied on particularized trust in 
the world market. In this situation, generalized trust becomes more important than 
particularized to retain competitiveness.  
 
2.2.   Prefecture government   
About one-third of local government revenues consist of local transfer and 
allocation taxes and national government disbursements (Doi & Ihori 2009, p.162). 
About 5 % of GDP is allocated to financial support for local governments. According to 
                                                   
10 Banfield (1958) provided a similar argument based on the case of a Southern Italian 
Village. 
11 Yamagishi & Yamagishi (1994) defined what I called particularized trust as “mutual 
assistance”.  Japanese society characterized by preferential treatments given to 
in-group members provides mutual assurance in closed and tightly-knit relationships 
(Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). 
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Doi & Ihori (2002), people and firms in urban regions, which hold about 60 % of the 
population of Japan, pay about 75 % of the annual national taxes. However, they receive 
fewer grants than do those in rural regions. This tells us that income is distributed from 
high income urban regions to low income rural regions. As shown in Figure 1, the per 
capita income of a prefecture is negatively related to prefecture government size, 
suggesting that the revenue coming from the central government is redistributed to low 
income prefectures and hence a low income prefecture‟s government size is relatively 
large. That is, heavy financial support provided by the central to local government 
seems to be the main reason why there are variations in local government size.  
  The degree of justice depends on whether local citizens can discourage local interest 
groups and politicians from diverting local government away from just serving 
themselves at the expense of the rest of society. Lobbying activities organized by local 
interest groups are especially observed in rural and agricultural areas (Doi & Ihori 
2002; Doi & Ihori 2009, Ch.7) 12 . Variations in government inefficiencies among 
prefectures are in part considered to be the result of differences in rent-seeking 
activities. Such activities by local interest groups are not easily observed by people, 
deteriorating relationships of the trust among people. 
The main areas of government expenditure at the prefectural level are education, 
public works and public welfare. According to Doi & Ihori (2009, Ch.7), after the 
mid-1970s, education showed a decreasing trend. This was because of the smaller 
numbers of students compared with earlier years; the result of a declining birth rate. In 
stark contrast to this, public welfare showed an increasing trend, reflecting a larger 
                                                   
12 „Agricultural-related public capital, fishing ports, flood control, and forest 
conservation have been over funded as a result of the lobbying activities of local-interest 
groups‟ (Doi & Ihori 2009, p.181). 
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number of older residents. A beneficiary is thus more likely to a specified group such as 
older generations. The public service is considered to be accompanied with a selective 
and needs-tested feature. In this situation, as argued by Kumlin and Rothstein (2005), 
interpersonal trust decreases. 
 
2.3.   Generalized trust 
I now focus on how prefecture government size is related to the degree of average 
generalized trust in each prefecture. Relationships between average trust and 
government size is shown in Figure2 (1), calculated using all samples. For closer 
examination, I divide the sample into workers and non-workers. The relationships are 
shown in Figure 2 (2) and (3) and are calculated from worker and non-worker samples, 
respectively.  
A cursory examination of Figure 2(1) illustrating the relationship between 
government size and average trust shows a slightly negative slope. This slope is 
unchanged in Figure 2 (2), while a slightly positive slope is observed in Figure 2 (3). 
However, it is not obvious from these that government size is correlated with the degree 
that people generally trust others because there are very small and almost surely 
insignificant correlations in all three cases. In section 4, more precise estimations are 
conducted by controlling for various factors and paying close attention to causality.    
The supply of public goods is determined through political processes, leading supply 
to be different from the optimum level in terms of economics. It is widely acknowledged 
that bureaucrats in the government sector have incentives to maximize their budgets 
(Niskanen 1971). The absence of a profit incentive induces government organizations to 
be less efficient (Buchanan & Wagner, 1977). As a consequence, a government tends to 
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become oversized and produce an oversupply of unnecessary public goods. As the cost 
for the supply of public goods is financed through taxation, citizens are likely to criticize 
government policy when the cost of public goods outweighs their benefit. However, a 
government has abundant information, which is difficult for ordinary people to access. 
As a result of this information asymmetry, “government can easily manipulate 
information to inflate the value of the public goods they want to supply” (Hayami 2001, 
p.227). Such manipulation is thought to be easier in the economic developing stage, 
since the average education level of the population is lower and the mass media is not 
sufficiently developed.  
Kumlin and Rothestein (2005) stress the design of public institutions, rather than 
the size of public institutions when relationships between public institutions and social 
trust are investigated. Their assertion is solidly based on the notion of “Procedural 
Justice”. People are likely to think that not only the results caused by public sector are 
important, but also the process to reach the result are as well (e.g., Lind and Tyler 1988; 
Thibaut and Walker 1975; Tyler 1998). People are usually interested in the extent to 
which they can enjoy public services; whereas they are also interested in whether the 
way public services are supplied is fair. For political legitimacy, it is critical that people 
are treated with equally by government institutions (Dworkin, 1977). Kumlin and 
Rothestein (2005) argue that a selective public service, which is provided to individuals 
only after an individual needs test, is problematic from the view point of procedural 
justice. This is because that the process of the test is not sufficiently open and so there is 
information asymmetry between government and individuals, leading programs based 
on the test to be at bureaucratic discretion. As a consequence, the selection process 
tends to be subject to suspicions of cheating, arbitrariness, favoritism and 
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discrimination. Accordingly, interpersonal trust is undermined by this public 
institution.  
When individuals are divided into workers and non-workers, the influence from the 
public sector is thought to differ. Workers more frequently participate in market 
transactions and so seem to be more aware of the government. an increase in 
government size reduces private consumption or investment, having a detrimental 
effect on the private sector. People working in the private sector are more likely to suffer 
from crowding out when government size is large. Workers in the private sector are 
more likely to face difficulties as a result of large government. This situation makes 
workers in the private sector more aware of procedural justice. Consequently, workers 
in the private sector are less likely to trust others. By contrast, workers in the public 
sector enjoy large government. For instance, workers in the public sector seem to 
benefit from government size because larger labor is demanded by larger government, 
and this is one of the reasons that these workers have a job. There are also industries 
that can be protected by the government and so get finance (Doi and Ihori 2009). 
Workers in the public sector and protected industries are not disturbed by government 
when they work. However, there is conflict between people in the private and those in 
the public sector. Workers in protected industries are opposed to workers in other 
industries. The more serious this conflict becomes, the larger the public sector is. As 
result, in at the public sector or in protected industries are also less inclined to trust 
others. 
 
3. Data and Method 
3.1. Data  
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This paper uses JGSS data, which are at an individual level. The JGSS surveys 
adopted a two-step stratified sampling method and were conducted throughout Japan in 
2001. JGSS was designed to be the Japanese counterpart of the General Social Survey 
in the United States. This survey asked standard questions about an individual‟s and 
his/her family characteristics through face-to-face interviews. This data covers 
information related to marital and demographic (age and gender) status, level of income, 
years of schooling, age, number of children, job category13, size of residential area, 
prefecture of residence, and opinion about generalized trust 14 . According to the 
population size of the geographical area, sample points were divided into three groups; 
(1) large cities, (2) other cities, and (3) villages and towns.  
The survey collected data from 2790 adults, aged between 20 and 89 years. This 
paper deals with the various individual characteristics noted above. Some respondents 
did not correspond to all questions and so the observations used for the estimations 
were reduced. Hence, as shown in Table 2, the sample size of non-workers and workers 
used for the estimations was 1619. When I restricted the respondents to between 25 and 
60, the size of sample was reduced to 1048. The non-workers sample size 642 becomes 
240 when respondents were restricted to ages between 25 and 60. This implied that 
many respondents did not have work, mainly because they were retired. The variables 
used for regression estimations are shown in Table 1, which indicates mean values. 
                                                   
13 Jobs are divided into 21 groups ; (1)agriculture, (2)forestry, (3) fisheries, (4) mining, 
(5) building, (6) manufacture, (7) electricity, gas, water supply, (8) transportation, (9) 
wholesale, (10) retail sale, (11) restaurant, (12) finance, insurance, (13) real estate 
business, (14) Mass media, (15) information industry, (16) Medical industry, (17) 
education, (18) law and account, (19) other service industries, (20) public sector, and (21) 
others. Job category dummies were constructed based on these groups. 
14 Data for this secondary analysis, "Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), Ichiro 
Tanioka," was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center 
for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo. 
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Years of schooling of the workers was 12.6, that it was larger than that of non-workers 
indicates that higher educated people are more likely to work. The age of workers is 
46.4, about 15 years less than that of non-workers. This partly reflects the fact that 
non-workers include retired people. It is interesting that marital status is almost the 
same between workers and non-workers, whereas the experience of divorce is distinctly 
larger for workers than for non-workers. 
With respect to generalized trust, considered as a crucial independent variable, 
respondents were all asked: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted?”. The possible responses to this question were "no", "depends", and “yes". Figure 
3 presents the distribution of generalized trust and shows that most male responses 
were „depends‟. Numbers responding „Yes‟ are slightly larger than the „No‟ responders. 
As for the prefecture level data, Gini, immigration rate, and government size are used. 
As referred to later, to alleviate any endogenous bias, these variables are lagged by five 
years. That is, I use these variables in 1996. The Gini coefficients of income in 1994 are 
from the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications15. 
Immigrants and prefecture populations are from the Asahi Shimbun (2004). The 
immigration rate is measured by (number of immigrants from another prefecture / 
Population). Using government expenditure and income obtained from the Index 
Corporation (2006), government size is measured by (Government expenditure/ Total 
household Income).  
 
3.2.  Methods 
  In line with the discussion above, the estimated function of trust then takes the 
                                                   
15 Gini data at the prefecture level are obtained every five years; as 1996 data is not 
available, I used 1994 data. 
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following form: 
TRUST ipv= 0 + 1 GOVSIZE p + 2IMIGRAp + 3GINIp + 4EDUipv +5AGEipv+ 
6MALEipv + 7INCOMipv + +8MARRYipv+9CHILDipv +10DIVipv 
+11MCITYipv +12TOWNipv +λv+ωipv , 
 
where TRUST represents the degree of generalized trust ranging from 1 to 3 in 
individual i, prefecture p, and individual‟s job category v. ‟s represents the regression 
parameters. λv represents the unobservable specific effects of v „s job categories, which 
is captured by job category dummies ; ωipv represents the error term.   
The model is estimated using the Ordered Probit method because the dependent 
variable is ordered. When the coefficient takes the positive sign, a positive change in the 
independent variable decreases the probability of a lower ranked outcome and increases 
the probability of the highest ranked outcome. However, “The marginal effects of the 
regressors on probability are not equal to the coefficients” (Greene 1997, p.927). 
Therefore, I encounter difficulty in the interpretation of the coefficients. Instead of a 
coefficient, marginal effects can be calculated in each category of dependent variable 
(Greene 1997, pp.927-931). Following Fischer and Torgler (2005), I also compute the 
marginal effects for the highest level of generalized trust. The marginal effect indicates 
the probability that a respondent chooses “yes” for responding to the question about 
generalized trust.  
As explained in the data section, the possible responses to the question about the 
generalized trust were "no", "depends", and “yes". Among these responses, “depends” 
calls for careful interpretation. It is unclear that “depends” can be considered as an 
intermediate category, or it may include a number of respondents who could have 
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answered in other categories if other possible responses were included in the 
questionnaire. For alleviating any bias arising from this, I also use a dummy, excluding 
“depends” from the sample, as a dependent variable. That is, in addition to Ordered 
Probit model, to check the robustness of the estimation results, using a sample where 
responses to the question about generalized trust were “yes", or "no", I attempt to apply 
the Probit method.   
     The effects of each variable on trust are now discussed. The key variable is 
government size, represented as GOVSIZE. From the discussion above, GOVSIZE is 
expected to take a negative sign. Heterogeneous society discourages people from 
trusting others (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). For the purpose of capturing 
socio-economic heterogeneity, IMIGRA and GINI are incorporated as independent 
variables16. Immigrants coming from another prefecture leads to a more culturally 
heterogeneous society, resulting in the decline of interpersonal trust. This conjecture is 
in line with the finding that the number of immigrants from other prefectures decreases 
interpersonal trust, although Japanese society is a racially heterogeneous society 
(Yamamura, 2008a)17. With the aim of capturing this effect, the rate of immigrants, 
IMIGRA, is incorporated as a dependent variable. The anticipated sign of IMIGRA is 
negative. With respect to economic inequality considered as economic heterogeneity, 
GINI (Gini coefficients) has been found to be negatively associated with trust (e.g., 
                                                   
16 Gini coefficient of each prefecture ranges from 2.66 (Shiga prefecture) to 3.80 
(Okinawa prefecture). It is found that Gini coefficient has a negative impact on the rate 
of respondents trusting neighbors in Japan (Yamamura 2008b). To put in another way, 
income inequality leads to a decrease in particularized trust in Japan. From the 
standpoint of comparative study, it is important to investigate the effect of income 
inequality on generalized trust in this study.  
17 Contrarily, there is an optimistic view that the openness of a society leads to the 
formation of generalized trust (Chan, 2007). Chan (2007) examined the impact of global 
integration on generalized trust and found the positive openness-trust relationship. 
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Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Bjørnskov 2006; Chan2007; Yamamura 2008a). It is 
necessary to deal with the endogenous problem, which has recently been stressed in 
some reports (e.g., Leigh 2006a; Bjørnskov 2006; Gustavsson & Jordahl, 2008). With the 
aim of alleviating potential endogenous problems with Government size, rates of 
immigrants and the Gini coefficient, these prefecture level variables are lagged five 
years.  
From previous reports (Zak & Knack 2001; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002), EDU will 
be positively correlated with trust and take a positive sign. The more educated people 
are, the more they are inclined to work and trust each other than to spend time 
verifying each others‟ actions, this is because the opportunity cost of this for them is 
high (Zak and Knack, 2001). As a consequence, the sign of EDU is predicted to become 
positive. Existing reports note that generalized trust increases with the level of income 
(Alesina & La Ferrara 2000). Hence, the anticipated sign of INCOM becomes positive. It 
is reasonably assumed that a larger population is more diverse, which controls for the 
heterogeneity that cannot be captured by heterogeneity variables as above (Bjørnskov 
2006). Hence, MCITY (medium size city) and TOWN (towns and village) dummies are 
predicted to take positive signs and the value of TOWN becomes larger than that of 
MCITY.  
Turning to family structure and marital status, people who trust more also tend to 
marry more easily. Furthermore, married people are more likely to meet and be 
acquainted with people through their spouse‟s personal network. Because of their 
frequent contact with unknown people, married people become more sociable than 
singles. Accordingly, married people are more inclined to trust others. People with 
children are likely to have opportunities to interact with other parents through PTA 
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meetings and various events for children held by community associations, leading 
parents to be integrated into interpersonal networks. These activities lead parents to be 
more likely to trust others through their interpersonal interactions. As a consequence, 
the sign for MARRY and CHILD are anticipated to become positive. Experience of 
divorce, DIV, is considered as a kind of trauma. DIV is included as a dependent variable 
to examine how trauma influences people‟s trust (Alesina & La Ferrara 2002). Several 
control variables are also included to capture individual characteristics: age (AGE) and 
male‟s dummy (MALE). 
 
3.3.   Instrumental Variables. 
  As argued by Bergh and Bjørnskov (2009), there is a possibly opposite causality 
between the government size and social trust. With low trust, welfare states would 
suffer from free riding and so eventually suffer financial distress. Trust is considered to 
lower costs for realizing the large government regarded as a “welfare state”18. If this 
holds true, endogenous bias arises when I conduct regression estimation to examine 
how the government size influences social trust. To control for this bias, I use 
instrumental variables such as political determinants of government size to conduct the 
two step estimation. In this study, government size is measured at the prefecture level 
and so instrumental variables are at the prefecture level. 
Budget allocations among various public goods are likely to be based on a calculation 
of the strength of enhancing political support (Downs 1957; Buchanan and Tullock 
1962). This leads a government to oversupply public goods and so become larger than 
the optimum size. Local-interest groups such as a political group are thought to increase 
                                                   
18 From another point of view, relatively lower trust can be appropriately reflect higher 
crime rate, and so in turn may necessitate larger government. 
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the group benefit through various lobbying activities. As a consequence, government 
size is more likely to be large as political pressure increases. The number of political 
groups per capita is thus anticipated to be positively associated with government size. 
Hence, the number of political groups per capita is used as an instrumental variable. 
Consistent with the anticipation, a cursory examination of Figure 4 (1) reveals that the 
number of political groups per capita is positively related to government size. 
As discussed in sub-section 2.2, information asymmetry about activity between local 
government and citizens leads to large government. The disclosure of official 
information ordinance was enacted to ensure government accountability in some 
municipalities (Jiyukokuminsha 2009). This ordinance guarantees the right to know 
information that the municipality has. Under this ordinance, a municipality is obliged 
to disclose information if a citizen requests for it to be disclosed. In 2001, there were 
3241 municipalities in Japan‟s 47 prefectures; an average of about 69 per prefecture. 
The rate of municipalities instituting a disclosure of official information ordinance 
increased and was approximately 75% in 2001, but 99% in 200919. Disclosure of official 
information ordinances seem to have alleviated the information asymmetry between 
government and citizens, leading to budget allocations becoming more efficient and so 
bringing about a reduction in government size. Hence, the rate of municipalities 
enacting the ordinance is predicted to be negatively associated with government size. In 
line with the prediction, looking at Figure 4(2) tells us that the rate of municipalities 
enacting such ordinances is negatively associated with government size. 
Using these instrumental variables to control for endogenous bias, I obtain the 
                                                   
19 See http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/2008/080801_1.html. (Accessed at 
August 10, 2010). 
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predicted value of GOVSIZE in the first stage OLS estimation. Then, in the second 
stage, I conduct the Ordered Probit and Probit estimations. 
 
4. Results 
4.1.   Ordered Probit Model and Two-stage Estimation. 
Table 2 reports the results of the Ordered Probit estimations. As a baseline 
estimation, I conducted the estimation based on the sample using all observations; this 
is presented in column (1). After splitting the total sample into workers and 
non-workers, estimations were conducted to compare the two groups in respect to the 
effects of government size on trust. The results for non-workers are shown in column (2) 
and those of workers in columns (3) and (4). As pointed out in the previous section, the 
age of workers is 46.4, which is about 15 years less than that of non-workers. Hence, the 
difference of regression results between workers and non-workers might be in part a 
generation effect if I conducted regression estimations separately for workers and 
non-workers. To alleviate this effect, I restrict the sample to those ages between 25 and 
60 and conduct an additional estimation using this sample. The result for this 
non-workers and workers sample aged between 25 and 60 years is reported in column 
(5). Results for non-workers between 25 and 60 years appear in column (6),  and for 
workers in columns (7) and (8)20. Samples in columns (1)-(8) in Table 3 (1) and (2), and 
Table 4 correspond to those in Table 2. 
Table 3 (1) shows the results of the second stage of the 2SLS model and Table 3(2) 
                                                   
20 As argued in the Section 2, government size is not thought to have the same effect on 
different types of work. It is thus necessary to control for the difference in the 
relationship with government among industries. To control for the features of work 
respondents, job category dummies are added as independent variables when 
estimations using the worker sample are applied. These results are presented in 
columns (4) and (8). 
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reports the first stage. Table 4 shows those using Two-stage Ordered Probit estimation 
where the predicted value of GOVSIZE is obtained from the OLS estimation in the first 
stage.  
Following Fisher and Torgler (2006), because the estimated coefficients do not 
indicate the magnitude of the effect, I compute the marginal effects for the highest level 
of social capital. These marginal effects are shown in Tables 2 and 4. As previously 
noted, the question related to generalized trust is: “Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted?”. Of the three possible responses, respondents who chose 
"depends" are thought to have a neutral and ambiguous standpoint. I thus conduct an 
estimation excluding them to restrict the sample to distinct positions; these results are 
shown in Table 6.  
I see from Table 2 that GOVSIZE is not statistically significant despite showing 
negative signs in columns (1) and (5). Hence, GOVSIZE does not generally influence the 
magnitude of trust. Furthermore, after splitting the sample into non-workers and 
workers, GOVSIZE shows positive signs for non-workers. The reason why GOVESIZE 
does not take the expected sign might be that bureaucratic red tape stemming from 
government is less apt to be associated with daily life such as community association 
activities, and so is less likely to be perceived by non-workers. Non-workers are less 
inclined to suffer from the negative externality caused by government. On the other 
hand, GOVSIZE indicates negative signs for the workers sample. Results for the 
workers sample show statistical significance with the exception of column (3); 
consistent with the anticipation. This implies that government size does not appear to 
generally influence the degree of trust for non-workers, while government size has a 
detrimental effect on trust for workers. For the sample for ages between 25 and 60, 
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z-statistics of workers without job categories is 1.81, while z-statistics of workers with 
job categories becomes 2.37. I now turn to the marginal effect of GOVSIZE reported in 
the angle bracket. I can interpret -0.54 as it appears in column (4) as suggesting that a 
1 % increase in government size leads to a 0.54 % decrease in the likelihood that a 
worker‟s response is “Yes” for the question about generalized trust. For ages between 25 
and 60, the marginal effect of workers without job category dummies is -0.53, whereas 
the marginal effect with job category dummies increases to -0.71. This implies that the 
effect of government size on trust is affected by job category. As discussed in Sub-section 
2.2, the effect of government size possibly reflects the per capita income of the 
prefecture. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the results when per capita income is 
included as an independent variable to identify the effect of government size. I see from 
Table A1 that the result of GOVSIZE is unchanged while per capita income does not 
influence trust. Other specifications exhibited in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 are also not 
changed when per capita income is included but not reported to save space21. 
Now I turn to the results for the control variables shown in Table 2. Contrary to the 
prediction, IMIGRA has a positive sign, despite being statistically insignificant when all 
generations are included. On the other hand, in line with the anticipation, IMIGRA has 
a negative sign, despite being statistically insignificant when respondents are restricted 
to ages 25-60. The signs of GINI are positive for non-workers and negative for workers; 
however, they are not statistically significant with the exception of column (7). These 
results indicate that variables to capture socio-economic heterogeneity do not influence 
trust. EDU and INCOM yield positive significant signs in all estimations for workers, as 
anticipated. On the other hand, EDU and INCOM are not statistically significant for 
                                                   
21 These results can be available upon request. 
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non-workers, with the exception of column (2). Education is thus important for forming 
trustful relationships through working activities, but not in non-market ones. I 
interpret the results of EDU for non-workers as suggesting that the opportunity cost of 
verifying each others‟ actions are not high for non-workers, even if they are highly 
educated. As a consequence, the level of education does not lead non-workers to trust. 
This is consistent with the argument of Zak and Knack (2001). The significant positive 
sign of CHILD for workers supports previous arguments that having a child leads 
parents to become involved in interpersonal networks and to trust others. On the other 
hand, CHILD for non-workers does not show statistical significance. As a whole, results 
of EDU, INCOM, and CHILD influences workers but do not affect non-workers. In my 
interpretation, this suggests that non-workers are less likely to be involved in social 
relationships than are workers. 
Consistent with the prediction, both TOWN and MCITY show positive signs with 
the exception of column (6). Furthermore, in most cases, the z-statistics for TOWN are 
larger than those for MCITY. As mentioned earlier, the homogeneity of non-urban areas 
is a reason why TOWN and MCITY take positive signs. In other interpretations, the 
results of TOWN and MCITY are thought to reflect the situation that residents in 
non-urban areas are less likely to meet strangers and so are more inclined to maintain 
stable relationships with colleagues within a closed community. That is, long-term 
interpersonal relationships lead people to trust “community members”. This kind of 
trust is considered particularized rather than generalized trust.  Results of control 
variables shown in Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 are similar to those in Table 2. Hence, I focus on 
the results of GOVSIZE hereafter because GOVSIZE is the crucial variable for 
exploring the relationship between government size and trust.  
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With respect to the second stage result of the 2SLS estimation shown in Table 3 (1), 
before discussing result of GOVSIZE, I check specification error. The over identification 
restrictions are not rejected in all estimations. This suggests that instrumental 
variables such as PGROUP and FACINF can be considered exogenous and the equation 
is well specified. Hence, the 2SLS estimation results do not suffer from bias. The 
positive sign of GOVSIZE presented in columns (2) and (6) shows that government size 
does not reduce the degree of non-worker‟s trust. On the other hand, as suggested in 
columns (3), (4), (7), and (8), GOVESIZE takes significant positive signs for the workers 
sample. Furthermore, absolute values of t-statistics and coefficients are larger for the 
results with job category dummies than those without. As whole, these results are 
similar to those shown in Table 2.  In Table 3(2) presenting the first stage estimation, 
PGROUP yields a positive sign and FACINF produces a negative one. Further PGROUP 
and FACINF are statistically significant at the 1 % level in all estimations; ; consistent 
with the prediction and so the choice of instrumental variables is supported. 
Concerning Table 4 which shows the resulst of two stage Ordered Probit estimation, 
the first stage results are the same as for Table 3(2) and so I do not report it. With 
respect to the signs of GOVSIZE and statistical significance, the results of GOVSIZE in 
Table 4 are similar to those reported in Table 2 and Table 3(1). It is interesting to 
observe that the marginal effects of GOVSIZE are -0.60 and -0.81 in columns (3) and (4), 
approximately 1.5 times larger than the -0.38 and -0.54 shown in  columns (3) and (4) 
of Table 2. As shown in columns (7) and (8) of Table 4 for ages 25-60, the marginal 
effects of GOVSIZE are -0.67 and -0.90, which are also distinctly larger than those of 
columns (7) and (8) of Table 2. This means that controlling for the endogenous bias of 
GOVSIZE leads to an increase in the GOVESIZE effect on trust. What is more, the 
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two-stage estimations suggest that there is causality from government size to 
generalized trust. 
From the estimations, I derive the argument that controlling for benefits, which 
are given to particular industries by the government, makes it more evident that 
government discourages workers from trusting others. In Japan, lobbying activity by 
local interest groups living in rural and agricultural areas has resulted in many deficits 
(Doi & Ihori 2002; Doi & Ihori 2009, Ch.7). Workers in an over-funded industry can 
enjoy the benefits given by government and so trustful relationships do not collapse 
within that industry22. On the other hand, workers in an over-funded industry are 
thought to be envied by workers in other industries, leading to friction and distrust 
between workers in over-funded ones and others. What is more, the cost for the supply 
of public goods is financed through taxation23. That is, workers in the public sector are 
employed by the government and so rely on the contributions of tax payers. A lack of 
competition leads public sector workers to provide lower quality service than the service 
provided by the private sector. Nevertheless, even if this is true, public sector ‟s workers 
do not lose their jobs. This situation leads to private sector workers distrusting those in 
the public sector. 
The combined results of Tables 2, 3 and 4 indicate that government size does not 
generally affect the magnitude of generalized trust. Nevertheless, closer examination 
tells us that government size has a detriment effect on the generalized trust of workers, 
but none on that of non-workers. It follows from this that government size hampers 
                                                   
22 „Agricultural-related public capital, fishing ports, flood control, and forest 
conservation have been over funded as a result of the lobbying activities of local-interest 
groups‟ (Doi & Ihori 2009, p.181). 
23 In Japan, items subject to the local taxes, and the tax rates, are specified in the Local 
Tax Law. This is a national law; local governments have very little authority to set local 
tax rates or impose local taxes (Doi & Ihori 2009, p. 157). 
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mutual trust in market transactions, but not in non-market. Government is considered 
to disturb efficient market transactions and so such activities destroy trustful 
relationships among individuals. Eventually, the larger a government becomes, the 
higher the transaction costs to the market. Government hampers the formation of social 
capital, resulting in impediments to economic development. This channel has hardly 
been acknowledged, but is considered important from the view point of public choice 
theory.     
 
4.2.   Probit model. 
To check the robustness of the results obtained above, I look at the results of the 
Probit model presented in Table 5 and the two-stage Probit model in Table 624. Tables 5 
and 6 show that GOVSIZE has positive signs for non-workers and negative ones for 
workers. GOVSIZE is statistically significant only for workers. Furthermore, the 
marginal effects of GOVSIZE are -0.89 and -1.21 in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5. 
Compared with the results of the Ordered Probit, marginal effects for workers are far 
larger than the corresponding results in Table 2. As presented in columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 6, after controlling for the endogenous bias cause by the reverse causality, they 
are -1.25 and -1.69, respectively. They are also larger than the corresponding results in 
Table 4. 
All in all, the results are consistent with Tables 2, 3 (1), and 4; even when I discard 
samples that show an ambiguous attitude to the question concerning trust. That is, 
alternative estimations show that results are unchanged and so what has been argued 
thus far can be strongly supported. 
                                                   
24 The first stage results of Table 5 are similar to those in Table 3(2). These results are 
available on request. 
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4.3.   Discussion. 
When the market does not function well in the early stages of economic development, 
informal social norms formed in a closed society can have important roles preventing 
members of the society from cheating others because ostracism leads to them losing the 
opportunity to gain a long-term benefit (Greif 1993, 1994, 2002; Kandori 1992). In this 
situation, an informal institution such as a community can function well with high 
levels of particularized trust. Informal social norms and the particularized trust can be 
considered complements. However, economic activity increases in a closed society and 
importance of social norms declines; in turn, formal rules based on a formal institution 
become more important to enhance efficient market transactions (Greif 1994; 2002). A 
formal institution is more effective with high levels of generalized, rather than 
particularized trust. For instance, generalized trust reinforces the effectiveness of the 
quality of formal institutions by reducing corruption (Bjørnskov, 2010). Formal rules 
and generalized trust can be regarded as complements. 
Generalized trust has a critical impact; on which economic policy is partly adopted. 
Aghion et al (2010) show that the level of distrust is associated with government 
regulation as follows. In low trust society, individuals do not trust business because 
business is not honest. They support government regulation for the purpose of removing 
producers imposing negative externalities even if such regulation leads to corruption. 
There is also reverse causality that government regulation leads to distrust. Aghion et 
al (2010) draw attention to the deep historical roots of modern society by discussing the 
persistent effects of legal origins on the level of trust. Apart from government regulation, 
outcomes of government policies possibly vary according to cultural and social 
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backgrounds including trust. Algan and Cahuc (2009) argued as follows: The Danish 
policy on the labor market is characterized by unemployment insurance; which if 
adopted leads to low unemployment rates. However, such a policy raises a moral hazard 
that is more difficult to overcome under conditions where individuals are more inclined 
to cheat over receiving government benefits. Accordingly, the provision of 
unemployment insurance is more costly in countries where social values are soft on 
cheating on unemployment, leading to the government providing lower unemployment 
benefits.   
Individual behavior is profoundly based on social values including trust shaped in a 
far distant historical incident or through long-term social interactions. Social values 
persist for a long time and are thus considered to impose real constraints on the choice 
of economic policy. Preexisting (historical) high level of social trust enables the 
Scandinavian welfare states to function well from their outset (Bergh and Bjørnskov 
2009). That is, the level of social trust formed under historical and cultural backgrounds 
can have an important role in determining the effectiveness of government and 
government size (Bergh and Bjørnskov 2009). This paper examines the reverse 
causality after alleviating the endogeneity bias and suggests that government size 
reduces the level of generalized trust. However, the results of this paper do not exclude 
positive feedback from social trust to government size. It might still be important to 
investigate the optimum government size by considering the cultural and historical 
background of society. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper explores the question of how government influences generalized trust, 
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something that is considered beneficial for various economic activities. Using individual 
level data from Japan, it is found that government size is not associated with 
generalized trust for non-workers, while government size is negatively associated with 
generalized trust for workers. This suggests that bureaucratic red tape coming from 
larger government is confronted and is understood through workers‟ work experience. 
On the other hand, non-workers do not perceive the corruption caused by large 
government so their generalized trust is not affected. Furthermore, for workers, 
government size has a larger negative effect on generalized trust after controlling for a 
worker‟s job category. This leads me to argue that some industries consist of special 
interest groups that benefit from particular government actions. Hence, the effect of 
government size varies according to the job category.  
Besides the direct influence of government on economic inefficiency through 
rent-seeking activities (Niskanen 1971), government reduces generalized trust among 
workers, resulting in the failure of collective action and high transaction costs, causing 
economic inefficiency. An individual‟s economic activity basically relies on mutual trust, 
which appears hindered by interruptions from government. A negative relationship 
between corruption and economic growth has been established (Mauro 1995). This 
negative relationship can be considered in part to be the outcome of a decrease of 
generalized trust, an issue that to date has not been well considered. The main 
contribution of this paper is to suggest that there is an indirect negative effect of 
government size on economic activity.  
Evidence provided in this research paper has been deduced from Japanese data 
sources. The effect of government size appears different between developing and 
developed stages (Yamamura 2009a). Furthermore, the extent of generalized trust 
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depends on country-specific characteristics such as culture and history. Hence, it is not 
clear that this paper‟s argument holds for countries other than Japan. Further research 
will be required to gather individual data from various countries to more closely 
examine the effects of government size on generalized trust.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
References 
 
Aghion, P., Algan, Y., Chahuc, P., and Shleifer, A. (2010). “Regulation and distrust. 
“ Forthcoming in Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
Alesina, A., and La Ferrara,E. (2002). “Who trust others?” Journal of Public Economics 
85: 207-234. 
Algan, Y., and Cahuc, P. (2009). “Civic virtue and labor market institutions.” American 
Economic Journal: macroeconomics, 1(1): 111-145. 
Angelopoulos, K., Pilippopoulos, A., and Tsionas, E. (2008). “Does public sector efficiency 
matter? Revisiting the relation between fiscal size and economic growth in 
world sample,” Public Choice 137: 245-278. 
Asahi Shimbun. (2004). Minryoku: TODOFUKEN-BETSU MINRYOKU SOKUTEI 
SHIRYOSHU (CD-ROM edition), Asahi-Newspaper, Tokyo. 
Asanuma, B. (1989). “Manufacture-supplier relationships in Japan and the concept of 
relation specific skill,” Journal of Japanese and International Economics 3: 
1-30. 
Bansfield,E.C. (1958). The moral basis of a backward society, New York: Free Press.  
Beugelsdijk, S., de Groot, H.L.F., and van Schaik. (2004). “Trust and economic growth: a 
robustness analysis,” Oxford Economic Papers 56: 118-134. 
Berggren, N., and Jordahl,H. (2006). „Free to trust: economic freedom and social 
capital,” Kyklos 59: 141-169. 
Bergh, A., and Bjørnskov, C. (2009). “Historical trust levels predict current welfare state 
design.” Ratio Working Papers, 144. 
Bjørnskov, C. (2006). “Determinants of generalized trust: A cross-country comparison.,” 
30 
 
Public Choice 130: 1-21. 
Bjørnskov, C. (2010). “Combating corruption: On the interplay between institutional 
quality and social trust.” forthcoming in Journal of Law and 
Economics. 
Bjørnskov, C., Dreher,A, and Fischer, J.A.C.(2007). “The bigger the better? Evidence of 
the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world,” 
Public Choice 130: 267-292. 
Bjørnskov, C., Dreher, A, and Fischer, J.A.V.. (2008a). “Cross-country determinants of 
life satisfaction: exploring different determinants across groups in 
society,” Social Choice and Welfare 30: 119-173. 
Bjørnskov, C., Dreher, A., and Fischer, J.A.V.. (2008b). „On decentralization and life 
satisfaction,” Economics Letters 99: 147-151. 
Buchanan, J.M., and Tullock, G. (1962).The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of 
Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Buchanan, J.M., and Wagner, R.E.. (1977). Democracy in deficit: The political legacy of 
lord Keynes. New York: Academic Press. 
Cassar, A., Crowley,L., and Wydick,B. (2007). “The effect of social capital on group loan 
repayment: Evidence from field experiments,” Economic Journal 117: 
F85-F106. 
Chan, K.S. (2007). “Trade, social values, and the generalized trust,” Southern Economic 
Journal 73: 733-753. 
Dar, A.A., and Amirkhalkhali,S. (2002). “Government size, factor accumulation, and 
economic growth: Evidence from OECD countries,” Journal of Policy 
Modeling 24: 679-692. 
31 
 
Doi, T., and Ihori, T. (2002). “Fiscal reconstruction and local interest group in Japan,” 
Journal of Japanese and International Economies 16: 492-511. 
Doi, T., and Ihori,T. (2009). The public sector in Japan: Past development and future 
prospects. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. 
Dworkin, R. (1977). Taking Rights Seriously. London, Duckworth. 
Easterly, W., and Rebelo,S. (1993). “Fiscal policy and economic growth: An empirical 
investigation,” Journal of Monetary Economics 32: 417-438. 
Fischer, J.A.V. and Torgler,B. (2006). “The effect of relative income position on social 
capital,” Economics Bulletin 26 (4): 1-20. 
Fölster, S., and Herekson,M. (2001). “Growth effects of government expenditure and 
taxation in rich countries,” European Economic Review 45: 1501-1520. 
Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: the social virtues and creation of prosperity. London: 
Hamish Hamilton. 
Glaeser, E.L., Laibson,D., Scheinkman,J.A., and Soutter,C.L. (2000). “Measuring Trust,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 811-846. 
Glaeser, E.L., and Saks,R.E. (2006). “Corruption in America,” Journal of Public 
Economics 90: 1053-1072. 
Goel, R.K. and Nelson,M.A. (1998). “Corruption and government size: a disaggregated 
analysis,” Public Choice 97: 107-120. 
Goel, R.K. and Budak,J. (2006). “Corruption in transition economies: effects of 
government size, country size and economic reforms,” Journal of 
Economics and Finance 30(2): 240-250. 
Greene, W.H. (1997). Econometric Analysis (3 eds), Prentice-Hall: London. 
32 
 
Greif, A. (1993). “Contract enforcebility and economic institutions in early trade: the 
Maghribi traders‟ coalition.” American Economic Review, 83: 525-548.  
Greif, A. (1994). “Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: A historical and 
theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies”. 
Journal of Political Economy, 102: 912-950. 
Greif, A. (2002). “Institutions and impersonal exchange: from communal to individual 
responsibility.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 
158; 168-204. 
Gustavsson, M., and Jordahl,H. (2008). “Inequality and trust in Sweden: Some 
inequalities are more harmful than others,” Journal of Public 
Economics 92: 348-365. 
Hayami, Y. (2001). Development economics: From poverty to the wealth of nations. 
(second edition). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Index Corporation. (2006). Chiiki toukei 2006 (CD-ROM edition), Index corporation, 
Tokyo. 
Jiyukokuminsha. (2009). Gendaiyogo no Kiso Chishiki (in Japanese). Tokyo: 
Jiyukokuminsha. 
Kandori, M. (1992). “Social norm and community enforcement.” Review of Economic 
Studies, 59: 63-80. 
Knack, S. and Keefer,P. (1997). “Does social capital have an economic payoff? A 
cross-country investigation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 
83-116. 
Knack, S. (1997).”Groups, growth and trust: Cross-country evidence one the Olson and 
Putnam hypothesis,” Public Choice 117: 341-355. 
33 
 
Kumlin, S. and Rothstein, B. (2005). “Making and breaking social capital: The impact of 
welfare state institution.” Comparative Political Studies, 38(4): 339-365. 
Lassen, D.D. (2007). “Ethnic divisions, trust, and the size of the informal sector,” 
Journal of economic behavior and organization,63, 423-438. 
Leigh, A. (2006a). “Does equality lead to fraternity?” Economics letters 93: 121-125. 
Leigh, A. (2006b). “Trust, inequality, and ethnic heterogeneity,” Economic Record 82: 
268-280. 
Lind, A.E. & Tyler, T.R. (1988). The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice. New York: 
Plenum Press. 
Mauro, P. (1995). “Corruption and growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 
681-712. 
Mendoza, E.G., Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., and Asea,P. (1997). “On the ineffectiveness of tax 
policy in altering long-run growth: Harberger‟s superneutrality 
conjecture,” Journal of Public Economics 66: 99-126. 
Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government, Aldine Atherton, 
Chicago. 
Peden, E.G., and Bradley, M.D. (1989). “Government size, productivity, and economic 
growth: The postwar experience,” Public Choice 61: 229-245. 
Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, 
NJ, Princeton University Press.  
Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, A 
Touchstone Book, New York.  
Putnam, R. and Goss, K.A. (2002). Introduction. In R.D. Putnam (Ed.), Democracies in 
Flux. The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society. New York: 
34 
 
Oxford University Press. 
Ramseyer, J.M. and Rosenbluth, F.M. (1997). Japan‟s Political Marketplace, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Rodrik, D. (1997). Has Globalization Gone too Far? Institute for International 
Economics, Washington. 
Sønderskov, K.M. (2009). “Different goods, different effects: Exploring the effects of 
generalized social trust in large-N collective action,” Public Choice 140: 
145-160. 
Statistics Bureau Management and Coordination Agency. (2002).Jigyosho Kigyo Tokei 
Chosa Hokoku. Tokyo: Statistics Bureau Management and Coordination 
Agency. 
Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. (various 
year). Zenkoku shohi zhittai chosa. Tokyo: Statistics Bureau of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications. 
Tachibanaki, T. (2005). Confronting income inequality in Japan: A comparative analysis 
of causes, consequences, reform. MIT Press, London. 
Thibaut, J. and Worker, L. (1975). Procedural Justice: A psychological analysis. 
Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates. 
Tyler, T.R. (1998). Trust and Democratic Governance. In by V Braithwaite & M. Levi, 
Trust & Governance. New York: Russel Sage Foundation. 
Uslaner, E. M. (2002). The Moral Foundations of Trust, Cambridge University Press, 
New York. 
Whiteley, P. (2000). “Economic growth and social capital,” Political Studies 48: 443-466. 
Wolfe, A. (1989). Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Obligation. Berkley: 
35 
 
University of California Press. 
Yamagishi, T., and Yamagishi, M. (1994). “Trust and commitment in the United States 
and Japan,” Motivation and Emotion 18: 129-166. 
Yamamura, E., (2008a). “The effects of inequality, fragmentation, and social capital on 
collective action in a homogeneous society: analyzing responses to the 2005 
Japan census,” Journal of Socio Economics 37(5): 2054-2058. 
Yamamura, E. (2008b). “Determinants of trust in a racially homogeneous society,” 
Economics Bulletin 26(1): 1-9.  
Yamamura, E, (2009a). “The influence of government size on economic growth and life 
satisfaction. A case study from Japan,” MPRA Paper 18439. 
Yamamura, E. (2009b). “Dynamics of social trust and human capital in the learning 
process: The case of the Japan garment cluster in the period 1968–2005,”  
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 72: 377-389. 
Zak, P.J. and Knack, S. (2001). “Trust and growth,” Economic Journal 111: 295-321. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Table 1.  Variable Definitions and Comparisons Between Workers and Non-workers 
Variables Definition Workers Non- 
workers 
 Prefecture level data   
GOVSIZE Government size: 
(Government expenditure in 1996)/ (Total household 
Income in 1996) 
 0.13 
 
0.14 
IMIGRA 
 
Rates of immigrant from other prefectures in 1996  0.02 
 
 0.02 
GINI Gini coefficient of income in 1994. 
 
 0.29  0.29 
  Individual level data   
GTRUST 
 
Generalized trust.  
Values range from 1 (No) to 3 (Yes) 
 2.11 2.05 
EDU 
 
Years of schooling  12.6 11.1 
AGE 
 
Ages 
 
 46.4  60.7 
MALE 
 
Male dummy, which takes 1 if individual is male, 
otherwise 0. 
 0.54  0.30 
INCOM 
 
Household income (10 million Yen)  0.71  0.46 
MARRY 
 
Marriage dummy, which takes 1 if individual is 
married, otherwise 0. 
0.74  0.72 
CHILD 
 
Number of children  1.59 1.95 
DIV 
 
Divorce dummy, which takes 1 if individual experience 
divorce, otherwise 0. 
 0.07  0.04 
MCITY 
 
Medium size cities dummy, which takes 1 if residential 
place is in medium size cities, otherwise 0. 
 0.57  0.56 
TOWN 
 
Towns and villages dummy, which takes 1 if 
residential place is in towns or villages, otherwise 0. 
 0.24  0.24 
 Instrumental variable for GOVISE  
(Prefecture level data) 
  
PGROUP Number of political groups per capita: 
Number of political groups/ population 
(Unit of Population is one thousand ) 
0.31 0.32 
DISCINF 
 
Rates of municipalities enacting disclosure of official 
information ordinance. 
(municipalities which enacted a disclosure of official 
information ordinance) / (All municipalities) 
0.77 0.76 
Note: Values are simple averages. Data sourced from the Asahi Shimbun (2004) and 
Index Publishing (2006), and the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications (various years).  Statistics Bureau Management and 
Coordination Agency. (2002) 
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Table 2.  Determinants of Generalized Trust: Ordered Probit.  
 (1) 
All 
 
(2) 
Non- 
workers 
(3) 
Workers 
 
(4) 
Workers 
 
 (5) 
All 
 
(6) 
Non- 
workers 
(7) 
Workers 
 
(8) 
Workers 
 
              All ages              Ages 25-60 
GOVSIZE -0.15 
<-0.04> 
(-0.26) 
1.37 
<0.39 > 
(1.43) 
-1.15 
<-0.38> 
(-1.45) 
-1.64* 
<-0.54> 
(-2.04) 
 -0.72 
<-0.23> 
(-0.94) 
1.89 
<0.58 > 
(1.11) 
-1.58* 
<-0.53> 
(-1.81) 
-2.11** 
<-0.71> 
(-2.37) 
IMIGRA 
 
3.80 
(0.75) 
6.82 
(0.87) 
1.95 
(0.29) 
0.10 
(0.02) 
 -1.17 
(-0.19) 
-1.08 
(-0.10) 
-1.12 
(-0.15) 
-2.53 
(-0.34) 
GINI -0.06 
(-0.03) 
3.93 
(1.29) 
-4.12 
(-1.60) 
-3.87 
(-1.43) 
 -1.60 
(-0.65) 
2.09 
(0.45) 
-4.78* 
(-1.66) 
-4.24 
(-1.41) 
EDU 
 
0.04** 
(3.41) 
0.02 
(1.03) 
0.06** 
(3.71) 
0.05** 
(2.87) 
 0.07** 
(3.82) 
0.07 
(1.62) 
0.07** 
(3.53) 
0.06** 
(2.67) 
AGE 
 
-0.002 
(-0.88) 
-0.006 
(-1.57) 
0.0008 
(0.24) 
-0.0009 
(-0.02) 
 0.002 
(0.54) 
-0.001 
(-0.23) 
0.003 
(0.65) 
0.002 
(0.52) 
MALE 
 
0.10* 
(1.70) 
0.16 
(1.41) 
0.07 
(0.91) 
0.10 
(1.21) 
 0.01 
(0.25) 
0.35 
(1.23) 
0.02 
(0.26) 
0.04 
(0.48) 
INCOM 
 
0.20** 
(4.13) 
0.21* 
(1.73) 
0.30** 
(3.31) 
0.28** 
(3.01) 
 0.23** 
(2.50) 
-0.009 
(-0.04) 
0.28** 
(2.75) 
0.26** 
(2.48) 
MARRY 
 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
0.05 
(0.35) 
-0.11 
(-0.72) 
-0.16 
(-0.97) 
 0.07 
(0.42) 
0.39 
(0.65) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.03 
(-0.17) 
CHILD 
 
0.05* 
(1.92) 
0.01 
(0.30) 
0.08* 
(2.06) 
0.08* 
(1.88) 
 0.08* 
(2.01) 
0.06 
(0.82) 
0.08* 
(1.87) 
0.08* 
(1.70) 
DIV 
 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.11 
(0.62) 
-0.05 
(-0.33) 
-0.09 
(-0.51) 
 0.01 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
-0.006 
(-0.03) 
MCITY 
 
0.15* 
(1.95) 
0.12 
(0.94) 
0.15 
(1.63) 
0.18* 
(1.92) 
 0.10 
(1.19) 
-0.19 
(-1.01) 
0.16 
(1.60) 
0.18* 
(1.80) 
TOWN 
 
0.30** 
(3.03) 
0.32* 
(1.98) 
0.28* 
(2.29) 
0.32** 
(2.56) 
 0.16 
(1.29) 
-0.34 
(-1.12) 
0.27* 
(2.00) 
0.30* 
(2.19) 
Job category 
dummies 
No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Observations 1619 642 977 974  1048 240 808 805 
Wald chi2 test 70.4 23.5 56.4 243.4  41.9 10.1 45.8 224.4 
36 
 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 
=0.02 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 
=0.60 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Note: Numbers are coefficients. Numbers in angle bracket are marginal effects calculated at the highest category. Numbers in 
parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, 
respectively. “Yes” in job category dummies means that job category dummies are included as independent variables, while “No” means 
that these dummies are not included. 
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Table 3. (1)  Determinants of Generalized Trust: 2SLS estimation (Second stage).  
 (1) 
All 
 
(2) 
Non- 
workers 
(3) 
Workers 
 
(4) 
Workers 
 
 (5) 
All 
 
(6) 
Non- 
workers 
(7) 
Workers 
 
(8) 
Workers 
 
              All ages              Ages 25-60 
GOVSIZE -0.39 
 (-0.87) 
0.72 
 (1.12) 
-0.96* 
 (-1.95) 
-1.29** 
 (-2.59) 
 -0.67 
 (-1.45) 
0.46 
 (0.51) 
-1.05* 
 (-1.93) 
-1.39** 
(-2.52) 
IMIGRA 
 
1.11 
(0.40) 
3.60 
(0.82) 
-0.24 
(-0.07) 
-1.46 
(-0.40) 
 -1.65 
(-0.50) 
-1.83 
(-0.33) 
-1.40 
(-0.34) 
-2.37 
(-0.59) 
GINI 0.09 
(0.09) 
2.05 
(1.28) 
-2.02 
(-1.49) 
-1.80 
(-1.27) 
 -0.68 
(-0.53) 
1.20 
(0.55) 
-2.44 
(-1.61) 
-2.05 
(-1.29) 
EDU 
 
0.02** 
(3.44) 
0.01 
(1.02) 
0.03** 
(3.76) 
0.02** 
(2.85) 
 0.03** 
(3.89) 
0.03 
(1.63) 
0.03** 
(3.58) 
0.03** 
(2.66) 
AGE 
 
-0.001 
(-0.86) 
-0.003 
(-1.55) 
0.0004 
(0.25) 
-0.0003 
(-0.02) 
 0.001 
(0.57) 
-0.0005 
(-0.15) 
0.001 
(0.64) 
0.001 
(0.49) 
MALE 
 
0.05* 
(1.66) 
0.08 
(1.39) 
0.03 
(0.85) 
0.04 
(1.11) 
 0.007 
(0.27) 
0.16 
(1.17) 
0.009 
(0.22) 
0.01 
(0.40) 
INCOM 
 
0.15** 
(4.04) 
0.11* 
(1.71) 
0.15** 
(3.21) 
0.14** 
(2.86) 
 0.11** 
(2.40) 
-0.01 
(-0.10) 
0.14** 
(2.71) 
0.13** 
(2.42) 
MARRY 
 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
0.02 
(0.34) 
-0.06 
(-0.71) 
-0.08 
(-0.96) 
 0.04 
(0.44) 
0.18 
(0.64) 
0.009 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(-0.15) 
CHILD 
 
0.03* 
(1.93) 
0.007 
(0.29) 
0.04* 
(2.04) 
0.04* 
(1.84) 
 0.04* 
(1.98) 
0.03 
(0.80) 
0.04* 
(1.85) 
0.04* 
(1.67) 
DIV 
 
0.008 
(0.12) 
0.06 
(0.93) 
-0.02 
(-0.28) 
-0.04 
(-0.46) 
 0.01 
(0.13) 
0.05 
(0.30) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
0.009 
(0.01) 
MCITY 
 
0.08* 
(2.03) 
0.06 
(0.93) 
0.08* 
(1.69) 
0.10* 
(1.97) 
 0.06 
(1.28) 
-0.07 
(-0.88) 
0.09 
(1.63) 
0.10* 
(1.82) 
TOWN 
 
0.16** 
(3.14) 
0.17* 
(1.97) 
0.16** 
(2.43) 
0.18** 
(2.68) 
 0.09 
(1.43) 
-0.14 
(-0.99) 
0.15* 
(2.07) 
0.16* 
(2.25) 
Job category 
dummies 
No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
O-I test p-value 
=0.72 
p-value 
=0.40 
p-value 
=0.85 
p-value 
=0.98 
  p-value 
=0.38 
p-value 
=0.94 
p-value 
=0.75 
Observations 1619 642 977 974  1048 240 808 805 
38 
 
R 2 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.08  0.03 0.03 0.05 0.08 
Note: Numbers are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. * and ** indicate 
significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. Constant is included in all estimations but not reported to save the space. “Yes” in 
job category dummies means that job category dummies are included as independent variables, while “No” means that these dummies 
are not included. O-I test means the over identification test (Hansen J test). 
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Table 3. (2)  Determinants of government size: 2SLS estimation (first stage).  
 (1) 
All 
 
(2) 
Non- 
workers 
(3) 
Workers 
 
(4) 
Workers 
 
 (5) 
All 
 
(6) 
Non- 
workers 
(7) 
Workers 
 
(8) 
Workers 
 
              All ages              Ages 25-60 
PGROUP 0.27** 
 (46.9) 
0.26** 
 (28.5) 
0.27** 
 (36.8) 
0.27** 
 (36.5) 
 0.27** 
 (38.5) 
0.26** 
 (16.5) 
0.28** 
 (34.7) 
0.28** 
 (34.9) 
DISCINF 
 
-0.08** 
(-23.9) 
-0.08** 
(-14.4) 
-0.08** 
(-18.9) 
-0.08** 
(-18.4) 
 -0.08** 
(-18.7) 
-0.08** 
(-8.70) 
-0.07** 
(-16.5) 
-0.07** 
(-16.0) 
IMIGRA 
 
-1.94** 
(-17.0) 
-2.07** 
(-11.3) 
-1.84** 
(-12.5) 
-1.80** 
(-12.1) 
 -1.90** 
(-13.5) 
-2.30** 
(-7.95) 
-1.75** 
(-10.7) 
-1.70** 
(-10.4) 
GINI -0.36** 
(-7.54) 
-0.31** 
(-4.14) 
-0.39** 
(-6.28) 
-0.39** 
(-6.14) 
 -0.41** 
(-7.22) 
-0.38** 
(-3.41) 
-0.46** 
(-6.70) 
-0.45** 
(-6.49) 
EDU 
 
0.0007** 
(2.39) 
0.0002 
(0.42) 
0.001** 
(2.78) 
0.0009** 
(2.34) 
 0.0009* 
(2.25) 
0.0004 
(0.41) 
0.001* 
(2.23) 
0.0009* 
(2.04) 
AGE 
 
0.0001* 
(2.26) 
0.00006 
(0.73) 
0.0001* 
(1.78) 
0.0001* 
(1.75) 
 0.0002* 
(2.18) 
0.0001 
(0.69) 
0.0002* 
(1.90) 
0.0001* 
(1.73) 
MALE 
 
-0.0008 
(-0.60) 
0.001 
(0.48) 
-0.001 
(-0.73) 
-0.0008 
(-0.20) 
 -0.0005 
(-0.31) 
0.0001 
(0.69) 
-0.0008 
(-0.45) 
-0.0001 
(-0.06) 
INCOM 
 
-0.003* 
(-1.86) 
-0.002 
(-0.66) 
-0.003 
(-1.49) 
-0.003* 
(-1.75) 
 -0.003 
(-1.38) 
0.0008 
(0.14) 
-0.003 
(-1.54) 
-0.004* 
(-1.75) 
MARRY 
 
0.001 
(0.74) 
0.004 
(1.29) 
-0.002 
(-0.60) 
-0.002 
(-0.66) 
 0.003 
(0.07) 
-0.0007 
(-0.06) 
-0.0003 
(-0.07) 
-0.003 
(-0.09) 
CHILD 
 
-0.0002 
(-0.31) 
0.0008 
(0.74) 
-0.0009 
(-1.08) 
-0.001 
(-1.09) 
 -0.001 
(-1.26) 
-0.0007 
(-0.06) 
-0.001 
(-1.12) 
-0.001 
(-1.16) 
DIV 
 
0.001 
(0.40) 
0.0009 
(0.17) 
-0.0006 
(-0.17) 
-0.0002 
(-0.06) 
 0.002 
(0.66) 
-0.001 
(-0.58) 
0.002 
(0.47) 
0.003 
(0.73) 
MCITY 
 
0.01** 
(7.73) 
0.01** 
(4.94) 
0.01** 
(5.88) 
0.01** 
(6.09) 
 0.01** 
(6.48) 
0.01** 
(2.69) 
0.01** 
(5.92) 
0.01** 
(6.10) 
TOWN 
 
0.01** 
(7.38) 
0.01** 
(3.54) 
0.01** 
(6.60) 
0.01** 
(6.60) 
 0.01** 
(5.57) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
0.01** 
(6.13) 
0.01** 
(6.06) 
Job category 
dummies 
No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Observations 1619 642 977 974  1048 240 808 805 
40 
 
F-statistics 384 
Prob>0.00 
142 
Prob>0.00 
243 
Prob>0.00 
100 
Prob>0.00 
 258 
Prob>0.00 
52 
Prob>0.00 
210 
Prob>0.00 
87 
Prob>0.00 
Note: Numbers are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. * and ** indicate 
significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. A constant is included in all estimations but not reported to save space. 
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Table 4.  Determinants of Generalized Trust: Two stage Ordered Probit 
 (1) 
All 
 
(2) 
Non- 
workers 
(3) 
Workers 
 
(4) 
Workers 
 
 (5) 
All 
 
(6) 
Non- 
workers 
(7) 
Workers 
 
(8) 
Workers 
 
              All ages              Ages 25-60 
GOVSIZE -0.63 
<-0.20> 
(-0.87) 
1.37 
<0.39 > 
(1.13) 
-1.84* 
<-0.60> 
(-1.97) 
-2.47** 
<-0.81> 
(-2.62) 
 -1.31 
<-0.43> 
(-1.47) 
1.07 
<0.33 > 
(0.54) 
-2.00* 
<-0.67> 
(-1.96) 
-2.65** 
<-0.90> 
(-2.59) 
IMIGRA 
 
2.09 
(0.40) 
6.82 
(0.83) 
-0.48 
(-0.07) 
-2.77 
(-0.40) 
 -3.23 
(-0.51) 
-3.76 
(-0.32) 
-2.62 
(-0.34) 
-4.49 
(-0.59) 
GINI 0.17 
(0.09) 
3.91 
(1.28) 
-3.81 
(-1.47) 
-3.58 
(-1.33) 
 -1.33 
(-0.53) 
2.60 
(0.56) 
-4.63 
(-1.61) 
-4.08 
(-1.35) 
EDU 
 
0.04** 
(3.43) 
0.02 
(1.03) 
0.06** 
(3.75) 
0.05** 
(2.93) 
 0.07** 
(3.87) 
0.07 
(1.64) 
0.07** 
(3.57) 
0.06** 
(2.72) 
AGE 
 
-0.002 
(-0.84) 
-0.006 
(-1.58) 
0.001 
(0.29) 
0.0001 
(0.04) 
 0.002 
(0.57) 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
0.003 
(0.66) 
0.003 
(0.61) 
MALE 
 
0.09* 
(1.66) 
0.16 
(1.41) 
0.06 
(0.85) 
0.09 
(1.09) 
 0.01 
(0.20) 
0.37 
(1.23) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
0.03 
(0.43) 
INCOM 
 
0.29** 
(4.03) 
0.21* 
(1.72) 
0.29** 
(3.19) 
0.27** 
(2.84) 
 0.22** 
(2.42) 
-0.002 
(-0.09) 
0.27** 
(2.70) 
0.25** 
(2.37) 
MARRY 
 
-0.003 
(-0.03) 
0.05 
(0.35) 
-0.11 
(-0.72) 
-0.15 
(-0.96) 
 0.08 
(0.43) 
0.42 
(0.70) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(-0.14) 
CHILD 
 
0.05* 
(1.93) 
0.01 
(0.30) 
0.08* 
(2.03) 
0.07* 
(1.84) 
 0.08* 
(2.00) 
0.07 
(0.85) 
0.08* 
(1.87) 
0.07* 
(1.67) 
DIV 
 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.11 
(0.61) 
-0.05 
(-0.29) 
-0.08 
(-0.47) 
 0.02 
(0.13) 
0.10 
(0.29) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
MCITY 
 
0.15* 
(2.03) 
0.12 
(0.93) 
0.16* 
(1.70) 
0.19* 
(2.03) 
 0.11 
(1.28) 
-0.18 
(-0.94) 
0.17 
(1.64) 
0.19* 
(1.88) 
TOWN 
 
0.31** 
(3.13) 
0.32* 
(1.98) 
0.30** 
(2.43) 
0.34** 
(2.70) 
 0.18 
(1.43) 
-0.33 
(-1.07) 
0.28* 
(2.08) 
0.32* 
(2.27) 
Job category 
dummies 
No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Observations 1619 642 977 974  1048 240 808 805 
Wald chi2 test 70.8 23.9 58.7 167  43.9 9.75 46.7 163.7 
42 
 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 
=0.02 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 
=0.63 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Note: Numbers are coefficients. Numbers in angle bracket are marginal effects calculated at the highest category. Numbers in 
parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, 
respectively. “Yes” in job category dummies means that job category dummies are included as independent variables, while “No” means 
that these dummies are not included. GOVSIZE is the predicted value obtained by OLS estimations in the first stage where 
instruments are the same as the 2SLS estimation reported in Table 3(2). The results of the first stage are the same as reported in Table 
3(2), and so are not reported here to save space. 
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Table 5.  Determinants of Generalized Trust: Probit (Excluding „depends‟ samples) 
 (1) 
All 
 
(2) 
Non- 
workers 
(3) 
Workers 
 
(4) 
Workers 
 
 (5) 
All 
 
(6) 
Non- 
workers 
(7) 
Workers 
 
(8) 
Workers 
 
              All ages              Ages 25-60 
GOVSIZE -0.80 
<-0.27> 
 (-0.74) 
2.06 
<0.75> 
 (1.14) 
-2.86* 
<-0.89> 
 (-2.09) 
-4.09** 
<-1.21> 
 (-2.79) 
 -2.14 
<-0.67> 
 (-1.62) 
3.15 
<0.89> 
 (0.91) 
-3.62** 
<-1.11> 
 (-2.46) 
-5.81** 
<-1.62> 
 (-3.51) 
IMIGRA 
 
6.71 
(0.68) 
15.7 
(1.00) 
1.02 
(0.08) 
-3.82 
(-0.30) 
 -7.48 
(-0.58) 
14.5 
(0.43) 
-7.42 
(-0.51) 
-13.9 
(-0.94) 
GINI 0.52 
(0.14) 
7.74 
(1.30) 
-7.09 
(-1.53) 
-8.05* 
(-1.69) 
 -2.03 
(-0.48) 
9.18 
(0.99) 
-7.37 
(-1.51) 
-7.65 
(-1.48) 
EDU 
 
0.06** 
(2.82) 
0.03 
(0.88) 
0.11** 
(3.17) 
0.12** 
(3.27) 
 0.10** 
(3.00) 
0.06 
(0.58) 
0.10** 
(2.65) 
0.09* 
(2.29) 
AGE 
 
-0.004 
(-1.09) 
-0.01* 
(-1.82) 
0.001 
(0.28) 
0.001 
(0.18) 
 -0.0002 
(-0.03) 
-0.01 
(-0.64) 
0.003 
(0.36) 
0.008 
(0.94) 
MALE 
 
0.15 
(1.43) 
0.29 
(1.46) 
0.11 
(0.80) 
0.14 
(0.85) 
 -0.02 
(-0.21) 
 0.02 
(0.16) 
0.07 
(0.39) 
INCOM 
 
0.70** 
(4.40) 
0.46* 
(1.77) 
0.79** 
(3.38) 
0.81** 
(3.58) 
 0.71** 
(3.08) 
0.01 
(-0.03) 
0.82** 
(3.05) 
0.78** 
(3.25) 
MARRY 
 
-0.004 
(-0.02) 
0.11 
(0.46) 
-0.24 
(-0.76) 
-0.30 
(-0.89) 
 0.18 
(0.58) 
1.76 
(1.47) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
0.11 
(0.29) 
CHILD 
 
0.12** 
(2.33) 
0.05 
(0.68) 
0.16** 
(2.33) 
0.15* 
(2.05) 
 0.16* 
(2.28) 
0.27 
(1.53) 
0.16* 
(1.95) 
0.14 
(1.57) 
DIV 
 
-0.03 
(-0.15) 
0.10 
(0.20) 
-0.05 
(-0.20) 
-0.02 
(-0.08) 
 0.10 
(0.36) 
-0.41 
(-0.34) 
0.10 
(0.32) 
0.23 
(0.64) 
MCITY 
 
0.17 
(1.15) 
0.20 
(0.91) 
0.17 
(0.79) 
0.19 
(0.92) 
 0.09 
(0.45) 
-0.61 
(-1.08) 
0.25 
(1.07) 
0.28 
(1.24) 
TOWN 
 
0.42* 
(2.27) 
0.49* 
(1.79) 
0.39 
(1.48) 
0.40 
(1.58) 
 0.15 
(0.63) 
-1.00 
(-1.55) 
0.42 
(1.44) 
0.49* 
(1.67) 
Job category 
dummies 
No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Observations 640 244 396 364  409 77 332 332 
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Wald chi2 test 65.3 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
23.2 
Prob>chi2 
=0.02 
49.9 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
67.8 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
 39.2 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
12.1 
Prob>chi2 
=0.36 
44.1 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
76.4 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Note: Numbers are coefficients. Numbers in angle bracket are marginal effects calculated at the highest category. Numbers in 
parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, 
respectively. “Yes” in job category dummies means that job category dummies are included as independent variables, while “No” means 
that these dummies are not included. A constant is included in all estimations but not reported to save space. 
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Table 6.  Determinants of Generalized Trust (Excluding „depends‟ samples): Two stage Probit 
 (1) 
All 
 
(2) 
Non- 
workers 
(3) 
Workers 
 
(4) 
Workers 
 
 (5) 
All 
 
(6) 
Non- 
workers 
(7) 
Workers 
 
(8) 
Workers 
 
              All ages              Ages 25-60 
GOVSIZE -1.34 
<-0.45> 
 (-1.01) 
2.66 
<0.96> 
 (1.19) 
-4.03** 
<-1.25> 
 (-2.40) 
-5.79** 
<-1.69> 
 (-3.20) 
 -3.25* 
<-1.01> 
 (-2.01) 
3.58 
<1.00> 
 (1.19) 
-4.38** 
<-1.33> 
 (-2.43) 
-7.18** 
<-2.00> 
 (-3.64) 
IMIGRA 
 
4.65 
(0.45) 
18.1 
(1.09) 
-3.29 
(-0.24) 
-10.2 
(-0.77) 
 -11.9 
(-0.89) 
16.5 
(0.48) 
-10.2 
(-0.68) 
-19.3 
(-1.28) 
GINI 0.80 
(0.22) 
7.34 
(1.22) 
-6.61 
(-1.44) 
-7.11 
(-1.52) 
 -1.51 
(-0.36) 
8.89 
(0.96) 
-7.04 
(-1.45) 
-6.87 
(-1.35) 
EDU 
 
0.06** 
(2.86) 
0.02 
(0.97) 
0.11** 
(3.27) 
0.12** 
(3.28) 
 0.11** 
(3.11) 
0.06 
(0.55) 
0.11** 
(2.71) 
0.09** 
(2.36) 
AGE 
 
-0.004 
(-1.05) 
-0.01* 
(-1.80) 
0.002 
(0.39) 
0.002 
(0.29) 
 0.004 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(-0.65) 
0.003 
(0.43) 
0.009 
(1.03) 
MALE 
 
0.15 
(1.41) 
0.28 
(1.43) 
0.10 
(0.70) 
0.12 
(0.75) 
 -0.04 
(-0.29) 
 0.01 
(0.09) 
0.05 
(0.32) 
INCOM 
 
0.69** 
(4.35) 
0.43* 
(1.78) 
0.77** 
(3.29) 
0.78** 
(3.40) 
 0.70** 
(3.00) 
0.01 
(-0.02) 
0.83** 
(2.99) 
0.75** 
(3.09) 
MARRY 
 
-0.0008 
(-0.00) 
0.11 
(0.45) 
-0.23 
(-0.72) 
-0.29 
(-0.87) 
 0.19 
(0.62) 
1.77 
(1.45) 
0.04 
(0.13) 
0.13 
(0.31) 
CHILD 
 
0.12** 
(2.34) 
0.05 
(0.65) 
0.17** 
(2.34) 
0.15* 
(2.06) 
 0.17* 
(2.30) 
0.27 
(1.51) 
0.16* 
(1.96) 
0.14 
(1.55) 
DIV 
 
-0.02 
(-0.11) 
0.10 
(0.21) 
-0.03 
(-0.11) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
 0.13 
(0.45) 
-0.40 
(-0.33) 
0.12 
(0.37) 
0.27 
(0.74) 
MCITY 
 
0.18 
(1.19) 
0.19 
(0.88) 
0.19 
(0.87) 
0.21 
(1.03) 
 0.11 
(0.54) 
-0.61 
(-1.07) 
0.27 
(1.13) 
0.21 
(1.34) 
TOWN 
 
0.43** 
(2.32) 
0.47* 
(1.73) 
0.42 
(1.56) 
0.44* 
(1.68) 
 0.19 
(0.75) 
-1.01 
(-1.55) 
0.44 
(1.50) 
0.53* 
(1.78) 
Job category 
dummies 
No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Observations 640 244 396 364  409 77 332 332 
Wald chi2 test 65.7 23.1 51.3 71.2  40.9 11.3 44.5 78.0 
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Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 
=0.02 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 
=0.41 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Note: Numbers are coefficients. Numbers in angle bracket are marginal effects calculated at the highest category. Numbers in 
parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, 
respectively. “Yes” in job category dummies means that job category dummies are included as independent variables, while “No” means 
that these dummies are not included. A constant is included in all estimations but not reported to save space. The first stage 
estimation result is very similar to those appearing in Table 3.2 and therefore this is omitted to save space. 
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Figure 1. Relationship between Government Size and per capita income. (All sample) 
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Figure 2 (1). Relationship between Government Size and Average Trust. (All sample) 
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Figure 2 (2). Relationship between Government Size and Average Trust. (Workers) 
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Figure 2 (3). Relationship between Government Size and Average Trust. (Non-workers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
 
 
 
 
0
5
1
0
1
5
D
e
n
s
it
y
1 2 3
trsut
 
Figure 3. Distribution of Trust 
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Figure 4 (1). Relationship between Government Size and number of pressure groups per capita. (All samples) 
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Figure 4 (2). Relationship between Government Size and rates of municipalities enacting a disclosure of official information ordinance. 
(All samples)  
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Appendix 
Table A1 .  Determinants of Generalized Trust: Ordered Probit.  
 (1) 
All 
 
(2) 
Non- 
workers 
(3) 
Workers 
 
(4) 
Workers 
 
 (5) 
All 
 
(6) 
Non- 
workers 
(7) 
Workers 
 
(8) 
Workers 
 
              All ages              Ages 25-60 
GOVSIZE 
 
-0.15 
 (-0.15) 
1.43 
 (1.45) 
-1.11 
 (-1.33) 
-1.60* 
 (-1.90) 
 -0.71 
 (-0.91) 
1.96 
(1.16) 
-1.64* 
 (-1.78) 
-2.16** 
 (-2.32) 
Per capita 
income 
0.27*104 
(0.34 
0.30*104 
(0.24) 
0.15*104 
(0.14) 
0.14*104 
(0.13) 
 0.01*104 
(0.02) 
0.47*104 
(0.25) 
-0.22*104 
(-0.18) 
-0.21*104 
(-0.18) 
Job category 
dummies 
No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Observations 1619 642 977 974  1048 240 808 805 
Wald chi2 test 70.5 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
23.7 
Prob>chi2 
=0.02 
56.5 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
244.1 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
 42.0 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
10.2 
Prob>chi2 
=0.60 
45.8 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
222.8 
Prob>chi2 
=0.00 
Note: Numbers are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. Besides GOVSIZE 
and per capita income, other independent variables used in Table 2 are included although their results are not reported in order to 
save the space. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. “Yes” in job category dummies means that job 
category dummies are included as independent variables, while “No” means that these dummies are not included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
